observe that TBG "is a dynamic, co-regulatory and co-evolutionary process, involving state, non-state and hybrid actors and organizations, which interact at multiple levels and in multiple ways with a range of effects."
1 This complexity creates a challenge for theory and framework development.
This essay adapts the model and insights of Eberlein, et al. into a systems model framework for analyzing TBG interactions. While Eberlein et al. recognize the dynamic nature of TBG interactions, their framework could be strengthened by placing greater emphasis on the extent to which the TBG actors and their interactions are fluid and in a constant state of learning, evolution, and adaptation over time and space. A systems framework is promising for the study of interactions because it disciplines researchers to identify those elements that shape and influence the interactions that produce the outputs of the system. These outputs include written rules, in the form of codes of conduct, as well as normative changes in behaviour. A systems framework recognizes that the TBG Subsystem is one of many within a broader interrelated social and economic system, and that the outputs of the TBG Subsystem are influenced by forces emanating from that broader system in addition to factors internal to the TBG Subsystem.
Importantly, a systems framework emphasizes the dynamic nature of interactions through the dominant presence of a Feedback Loop.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Part I, we will review the main elements of the interactions in the labour sphere seems so unlikely: it is vague, difficult to measure, and potentially very costly to employers and buying corporations. Yet, some form of living wage standard had made it into almost all of the major TBG scheme model codes by the turn of the century. Only one resisted, the American-based Fair Labor Association (FLA). However, even the FLA has recently taken steps towards incorporating a living wage standard. The character of interactions relating to the living wage standard has varied over time, from competition to coordination to cooptation. The systems framework provides a model to help researchers track the mechanisms of interaction over time, and possibly, to anticipate how changes in one component of the system will affect outputs within? the TBG Subsystem.
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for coordination or collaboration in order to address a problem of externalities or free riders? Are there internal drivers, including values, power structures, and goals that drive interaction? Or external drivers, such as market forces, threats of state legal intervention, and so forth? 
What is the Character of Interaction?
The authors identify 4 categories of interaction:
(1) Competition; (2) Coordination; (3) Cooptation; and (4) Chaos. A TBG system can include more than one of these at any given time, and evolution or digression from one to another. 
What are the Effects of Interaction?
There is a need to distinguish between impacts on the actual behaviour that the TBG project is trying to influence (e.g., factory level labour practices), and other institutional and intermediate regulatory effects or outcomes. For example, researchers may address the effects on the norms and standards being defined in TBG schemes, or on the management of supply chains, or other market behaviours. 
How do TBG interactions develop over time?
Finally, the authors recognize that the study of interactions is a study of dynamic processes and change. Therefore, a framework for the study of TBG interactions must be dynamic and be capable of explaining how the effects of interactions influence change, and how interactions themselves change over time. 8 Eberlein et al remind scholars of the need to disaggregate interactions into their component parts. In this way, analysis can better capture the complexity of interactions, and help build a sustainable theory. Although they do not present their framework in a systems framework, the authors have described the core elements of a basic open-systems model.
Systems models can be particularly useful in helping to conceptualize complex and dynamic interactions. In the remainder of this paper, I develop a systems framework for the study of TBG interactions, drawing on insights from Eberlein et al.
II. A Systems Framework for Analyzing Transnational Business Governance Interaction
The systems interaction framework developed here recognizes that the TBG system operates within a larger environment that includes various other functional subsystems that both influence the TBG system, and are influenced by it in an ongoing, dynamic process. It draws on insights with deep scholarly roots that, due to space limitations, will not be explored in this paper. Talcott Parsons described social systems as, "the system generated by any process of interaction, on the socio-cultural level, between two or more actors", which "either [are] concrete human individual[s]…or a collectivity of which a plurality of persons are members." 9 A key insight that emerges from systems theory in the Parsonian tradition, as developed later by scholars such as Niklas Luhmann and Gunther Teubner, is that society is differentiated into a 8 Ibid. at 26-26. (London, Routledge, 1956 ), at 8.
T. Parsons & N. Smelser, Economy and Society, A Study in the Integration of Economy and Social Theory
series of autonomous, functional subsystems that are both 'closed'-they produce their own norms, logics, institutions, and discourses, and reproduce in accordance with them-and 'cognitively open'. 10 Subsystems are 'open' in the sense that external signals emanating from other functional subsystems can penetrate and provoke changes within them. However, the manner and extent of change is often unpredictable, because external signals are filtered through the internal normative logic and communicative modes of the receiving subsystem. 11 Systems theory recognizes that norms and institutions are in continuous evolution, that they 'learn', and that subsystem outputs feed back into the social system as inputs in a continuous loop.
These insights form the bedrock for a basic systems framework for studying TBG interactions. 12 The core elements of a transnational business governance systems framework are outlined in Figure 1 . It consists of 6 components: (Prentice-Hall, 1983 ). Industrial relations systems are a useful analogy to TBG interactions, because both involve complex interactions between multiple and dynamic public and private actors and legal systems, operating with a larger social, political, and economic matrix.
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Feedback Loop, demonstrating the dynamic nature of the TBG subsystem as interactions occur within the subsystem, and between it and other social subsystems.
These components can be demonstrated in a useful diagram form (See Diagram 1). can influence events in other labour markets, and also influence other types of markets. For example, a highly publicized scandal involving child labour in a region within Pakistan can disturb consumer demand for products made anywhere in the world that have the taint of child labour. This might result in fewer child workers, which could raise productions costs, and then product costs, causing a decrease in the demand for the products. This could also lead to a lowering of family incomes in places where children used to work, which could affect economic markets in those communities. These interrelationships are complicated, and will often be difficult to measure.
The Legal Subsystem includes local, regional, national, supranational, and international legal norms and rules. As Eberlein et al observe, while the focus of TBG tends to be on the role played by private (non-state) actors, states still play an important role through political (see discussion of the Political Subsystem below) and legal action. 
Internal Components of the TBG Subsystem
The TBG Subsystem is comprised of four key components: 
b. Internal Inputs
Each of the actors within the TBG Subsystem is guided by and framed by its own set of Internal Inputs, which can evolve over time in response to both internal and external pressures, experiences, and opportunities. 26 Five such inputs are central to understanding interactions within the TBG Subsystem. Firstly, Goals and Objectives are desired outcomes that actors seek to realize. They provide the motivation that guides actors in their engagements with other actors.
Variations in the goals and objectives of the many actors involved in TBG contribute to the complexity of the system. Mapping actors' goals and objectives is important to understanding interactions within the TBG Subsystem, since, as Eberlein et al note, alignment of goals is a "powerful enabler" of cooperation, as misalignment is of conflict". Goals and Objectives can vary not only across actors within the TBG Subsystem, but sometimes within actors as well. Depending upon how incentive systems are devised, the interests and experiences of individual managers may not always be aligned with the interests of the organizations they work for. 28 Departments within organizations can have conflicting interests that are resolved through power interactions and negotiations. For example, the CSR department within a corporation may support a new code of conduct and greater transparency about supplier practices, whereas the Sourcing department within the same corporation may strongly oppose both initiatives. Industry associations may include members with widely different goals and objectives, and those members may represent only a small fraction of enterprises operating within the industry. Therefore, we cannot assume that an industry association's goals always align with those of the actors within that industry. NGOs might find common ground with one another on specific issues, but profoundly disagree on others.
The second key Internal Input is Values. "Values" are the system of beliefs upon which an actor formulates its goals and objectives and assesses the various courses of action for pursuing them. Bernstein and Cashore note that the first firms to support TBG schemes are often those whose core value systems align with those of the scheme:
…firms that market environmentally or socially sustainable products have a clear incentive to join because their core values fit with the system. Indeed, when a firm faces uncertainty over its profit-maximizing choices, it may fall back on existing values, which could include environmental stewardship or social responsibility.
29
For example, when Levi-Strauss adopted its vendor code of conduct in 1992, and again when it published its supplier factory list, it cited its founder's value system and the company's decades' long commitment to social issues. 30 Yet, researchers need to look beyond an actor's own public literature and press releases to identify core values. 31 An actor's values can make some courses of action unthinkable, while opening up new courses of actions not evident to other actors.
The third Internal Input is Power. Power is the ability to achieve one's goals and objectives despite resistance from others. 32 TBG actors derive power from a variety of sources.
Market forces and wealth are an obvious source, but economic power can be, and often is, offset in some measure by other power sources. These can include moral or religious power, cultural power in the form of embedded social norms, communicative power in the form of the capacity to disseminate facts or ideas, or legal power. Walmart possesses sufficient market or economic power to impose contract terms that are almost certain to force their suppliers to shirk on overtime pay laws. However, the ability of Walmart to exercise that power may be restrained by the power Civil Society actors to disseminate stories blaming Walmart for illegal conditions in its supplier factories, or by the power of consumers or socially conscious investors to inflict economic damage. The power of a buying firm to influence change in the labour practices of a supplier depends on its share of the supplier's business. The power of civil society actors within the TBG Subsystem derives in large measure from the demand for socially responsible production practices, but that demand fluctuates. 
III. An Application of the System Framework: The Living Wage
The emergence of the 'living wage' standard in many labour-related TBG schemes can be used to demonstrate the Systems Framework. The living wage (LW) is an interesting subject for a number or reasons. As a slogan, it carries considerable attraction; who could object to paying workers a wage that permits them to live a decent life. However, it also has the potential to impose substantial new costs on supply chain systems that could undermine the comparative advantage enjoyed by low wage suppliers. What those costs are remains uncertain, though, because there is also little agreement on how to calculate a living wage. These latter factors make the LW an unlikely standard to emerge as an output of the complex interactions within the TBG Subsystem concerned with supply chain labour practices.
A. The Origins of the Living Wage Standard Within the TBG Subsystem
There is a long and complicated factual matrix that can be reduced to its core components for our purposes. The story of the LW begins outside of the TBG Subsystem. The "living wage"
has deep historical roots in the economic, social, political, and legal subsystems of bygone eras.
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British trade unions were advocating for a living wage by the 1870s. 54 In the 1880s, the Knights How could they be expected to order their contractors to implement a standard which even economists could not agree on how to calculate? If pressed, it was possible to commit to paying a LW in principal, while falling back on the lack of agreement on how to calculate to explain the lack of movement towards actually implementing it throughout a supply chain. 65 One risk was the possibility that new laws would impose obligations on corporations to police their suppliers' labour practices. 66 New developments in External Inputs, including in the Economic, Legal and Political Subsystems made this a possibility in the 1990s. In the U.S., President Bill Clinton had campaigned on a promise to address growing public concerns about "American jobs" being shipped to developing economies where workers would lack decent employment laws and working conditions.
Businesses and industry associations mostly ignored the
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Mamic, supra note 60 at 331: "Although the [MNCs] studied have faced pressure form civil society to pay workers a wage that meets the suppliers' workers' basic needs, sometimes referred to as a living wage, thus far the MNCs have not publicly entered into the debate.
[MNCs] with codes … require their suppliers to adhere to their stated provisions of paying the local minimum wage or prevailing industry wage."
However, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), enacted in 1993, failed to stem these concerns. 67 In 1996, the possibility of a "social clause" being included in 
C. The Fair Labor Association and the Struggle Over the Living Wage
The credibility of the burgeoning FLA suffered a serious blow when the only two In sharp contrast to the FLA, the WRC's governance structure excluded participation by business, which was intended to strengthen its claim of independence from the entities it would govern. The WRC targeted branded apparel sold at American colleges and universities. Schools that affiliated with the WRC were required to adopt a code of conduct and apply it to suppliers of school-branded apparel. The WRC sought to carve out its own space of authority by purporting to be everything that the FLA was not: independent, transparent, and substantive. Its model code included a strong living wage clause, as well as a compliance procedure, and much greater reporting and transparency requirements than the FLA. 72 Since the college apparel market was so lucrative, Business actors who had endorsed the FLA, including Nike, decided (sometimes the Constitution, referenced the need for "wages and earnings" to be calculated to ensure "a minimum living wage". The ILO's standards are directed at states, not employers and corporations, but this has not deterred TBG Civil Society actors from pointing to the ILO as moral and legal authority in its advocacy for the LW standard.
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The inclusion of the LW standard in most multi-stakeholder TBG Schemes, and the normative authority of the ILO's support for it, undermined the legitimacy of the FLA and other schemes that omitted the standard. The systems framework predicts that how these schemes respond to this threat will be influenced by their respective Internal Inputs, including their Goals Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work that described the "core" labour standards. In fact, the ILO has deliberately steered clear of trying to set precise wage levels. As an ILO representative explained, "the term 'living wage' only appears in the preamble to the ILO Constitution, with the operative clauses of the constitution only speaking about 'minimum wages'". 76 However, the notion that wages should take account of reasonable standards of living for workers and their families is referenced indirectly in a variety of instruments. Convention 26, Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery (1928) directs states to implement minimum wage systems, and Recommendation 30 (1928) explains that those minimum wages should "take account of the necessity of enabling the workers concerned to maintain a suitable standard of living." Convention 131, Minimum Wage Fixing (1970) similarly noted that minimum wages should take account of national conditions, and also the needs of workers and their families, taking into account the cost of living, social security benefits, and the relative living standards of other social groups.
77 WRAP added this explanation of its lack of a LW standard to its website: "The discussion and debate about a "living wage" has been going on for centuries. Numerous recent attempts to define such a wage have been made but no
The situation was more complex for the FLA. Its' direct 'competitors' were other multi- promised to consider "pilot projects" on the LW over a period of three years, and to encourage more research into LW calculations. Directing the discourse towards debates over precise mathematical calculations of a LW standard enabled the FLA to balance competing interests within its own governance structure, while still declining to recognize the LW standard formally in its model code.
D. The Jo-In TBG Scheme Collaboration and the Living Wage
These debates continued through a process of ongoing subsystem wide feedback and interaction. While there were real philosophical and practical disagreements between many of the actors operating within the TBG Subsystem, there was also a learning process underway, The LW standard was a source of considerable conflict in the Jo-In discussions. There were fundamental disagreements about how difficult it was in practice to measure and implement a LW. The CCC and WRC accused the FLA of hiding behind calculation difficulties to avoid the standard altogether, as noted in the Jo-In Interim Report:
WRC and CCC do not consider that a lack of know-how or evidence is a significant barrier to living wage implementation. Rather, they consider that the larger problem is a lack of sufficient political will and that companies, in particular, use such technical complexities as a shield against real action in this area. WRC holds strong views that 83 http://www.jo-in.org/pub/docs/Jo-In%20Draft%20Common%20Code%205.05.pdf:
Workers shall have the right to a living wage. Wages and benefits paid for a standard working week shall, as a floor, always comply with all applicable laws, regulations and industry minimum standards and shall be sufficient to meet basic needs of workers and their families and provide some discretionary income brands' pricing practices are the main obstacle to implementation of a living wage. CCC Finally, in February 2011, a new wage standard was tentatively agreed upon at the FLA Board level. The standard recognized that workers have a right to a wage that meets basic needs and provides discretionary income. It still required employers to pay minimum or prevailing wage, whichever is higher. However, when that is not sufficient to meet basic needs and provide discretionary income, employers must develop strategies to "progressively realize"
compensation that does. 91 The reference to "progressive realization" was consistent with the approach of the "wage ladder" developed at the Jo-In (Mimicry). It recognizes that "living Our story of the living wage standard covers a period of time. The story is not over. In the period covered, the TBG Subsystem moved some way towards normalization of a LW standard in TBG Schemes. However, it has done so only at the level of the first type of Output:
Substantive and Procedural Rules. There is little evidence that the LW standard is being implemented in practice, or that it is causing real Behavioural or Organizational Change, the second type of TBG Subsystem Output. The systems framework draws an important distinction between 'rules,' on one hand, and normative changes in behaviour, on the other hand. In some instances, the TBG Subsystem may produce rules only because the actors know that the rules will never be implemented in practice. Studying how rules produce behavioural change over time, or fail to do so, is an important challenge for the study of TBG interactions.
The second dominant theme is the importance of the dynamic systems framework's Feedback Loop. The TBG Subsystem developed in response to important changes in the External Subsystems. In the case of supply chain labour issues, for example, TBG schemes were a response to growing consumer demand for 'sweatshop free' goods (Economic, Social Subsystems) and the perceived failure of states to respond adequately to this challenge (Political, Legal Subsystems). This means that TBG Schemes addressing labour practices remain vulnerable to future changes in these External Subsystems, including indifference by consumers, or the emergence of new state-based legal models that would supplant TBG Schemes. Whether developments such as these occur is partly a function of the Outputs of the TBG Subsystem that consequently feed back into the external environment. If TBG actors keep labour issues in the media, then public apathy will be less likely to occur; if TBG Schemes appear to be producing positive normative changes in labour practices, then states will feel less pressure to intervene.
The TBG Subsystem is in a constant state of evolution, as the actors adjust to the forces acting on them from both within the Subsystem, and from outside of it. These evolutionary forces are not always obvious, which creates a challenge for researchers of TBG interactions.
Often it will be necessary to build a complex factual matrix to capture the essence of the interactions, as I have attempted to do here in respect of just one TBG standard. As Eberlein, et al. note, rarely will it be possible to draw a direct causal line between event A and output B.
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The explanations will be more complex. Researchers need an analytical framework to help guide the investigation. Eberlein, et al. have taken an important step in this direction with their framework. This paper has built on their contribution by redeploying many of their insights into a systems framework with a greater emphasis on the dynamic nature of TBG interactions.
